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The information which was obtained through in-depth interviews with several informants on the general 
evaluation of the Kardemir privatization indicate that, whether or not Kardemir was introduced as a 
permanently successful model, its success was realistic at least until the year 2001, notwithstanding 
the fact that the present state of affairs seems to run counter to the general logic of labor unionism. The 
article then argues for a research agenda to re-examine and revise the ways that can make the 
employee ownership process more successful in the light of ongoing changes in employment relations 
at Kardemir Industry, Turkey. 
 





The privatization, and/or the closure of unprofitable public 
enterprises had always been a perennial item on the 
economic agenda of Turkish governments since the early 
1980s. Obviously most employee buyouts occur when a 
company is in severe economic difficulty or failing. Yet 
worker ownership is very much in the news as many 
organizations pursue it as a strategy for ensuring 
organizational survival. The realization of economic 
democracy through workers' participation in management 
has been widely discussed in practice and theory 
(Toscana, 1981). And in Turkey in the past, there have 
been participatory practices based either on the em-
ployer's initiative or applied under collective agreements. 
In fact, preparations for the contemplated sale of state 
assets had already led to far-reaching changes in 
industrial relations and employment practices in the State 
Economic Enterprises (SEEs) of Turkey. But, for the first 
time in Turkey, Karabuk Iron and Steel Factories (now 
called as Kardemir) were privatized by selling more than 
half of the corporation shares to employees. Thus, a new 
kind of privatization in which the employees become the 
owners was created in Turkey since the labor union 
Özçelik-Iş1 (Union Steel’s Business of Turkey) 
experienced an active  participation  in  its  administration  
for the first time, both in the process and after the 
process.   
Naturally, the shift of an enterprise from the public to 
private sector results in radical changes in its 
administration and labor and industrial relations practices. 
Employer-employee relations, union activity and collec-
tive bargaining traditions, working conditions, wages and 
career systems are exposed to radical alterations. Dereli 
(2006) reported in fact, privatization creates diverse 
consequences in the enterprises where the employees 
also become the owners. As a result, employees and 
their organizations turn out to be the most affected 
parties in the process (Ersoz et al., 2002; Yeldan, 2002). 
In Kardemir the union which was active in the priva-
tization of the enterprise had undertaken a significant role 
in designating representatives to the administration of the 
enterprise. Labor unions in Turkey are as a matter of 
principle against privatization; and they had already 
witnessed a decline in their membership even as a result 
of preparations for privatization (for example, H. Ersoz, 
Labor and Social Security Ministry of Turkey, under-
secretary assistant, personal communication). Wyatt 
(2010) remarked as they generally view privatization as a 
move  to  weaken  and  ultimately  to  destroy   the   labor 
 




movement. In the Kardemir case worker ownership was 
used as a tool to decrease the social adverse effects of 
privatization and pursue a certain strategy to ensure 
organizational survival, whereas labor unions had favored 
only the restructuring of the SEEs through delegation of 
increased autonomy to professional managers. This 
skepticism has focused on whether employee ownership 
is feasible and whether it really serves workers' interests.  
Employees may directly buy shares in the company as 
bonus given to them or shares in any profit-sharing 
method of employee’s participation system. Survey of the 
major studies in the field of employees’ participation as 
shareholders shows that this can occur in several ways. 
For example, first, in the form of company shares, the 
subsequent payments have to be made through the 
provision of the loan closing upon receipt of securities 
and establishment of hedging transactions (Demirkan, 
1999; Bradley, 1986).  In the employee-owned company, 
by contrast, the situation is a different one. Logue et al. 
(1998) stated that employees are co-owners with 
management, the owning family or the outside owners or 
- where the majority or all of the shares are owned by 
employees – they are the predominant or exclusive 
owners. Schalk and Rousseau (2001) cited Hammer and 
Stern (1980) and Pierce et al. (1991) reporting that 
workers’ ownership of the firm does not automatically 
translate into greater participative decision making in 
worker cooperatives than in conventionally owned firms. 
Workers do not participate in firms’ decision making 
process or inevitable to do so, when they are little finan-
cial knowledge. Bernstein (1979) denotes importance of 
financial knowledge but reports that although participation 
is greater when financial information is shared with inves-
tors and workers, how much information is transmitted 
depends on the intellectual level or level of business 
literacy workers possess. Thus, union members are both 
workers and owners; yet the managers manage them as 
employees and workers work under their supervision, in 
other words they are both employees and direct owners. 
Under the employee ownership system in Karabuk, the 
enterprise was sold to the employees under special 
circumstances and the employees bought the enterprise 
by obtaining shares in return for their severance pay 
entitlements. Each employee was given the right to 
purchase shares depending on their wage levels and 
seniority. Study of Ersoz et al. (2002) pointed out that a 
‘joint privatization’ was used in Kardemir where the 
shares were bought by the investors and employees in 
designated ratios (According to the concluded contract 
the designated ratio assigned 35% of shares to the 
employees of the company, 40% to local associations of 
manufacturers and small-scale retailers, 25% to local 
citizens). The outcome was an appropriate combination 
of internal buyers where the enterprise was bought by the 
managers and employees of the enterprise as well as by 
the external agents from the private sector that obtained 





employees were the major partners of the enterprise; 
they owned the sizable part of the shares and 
consequently employee representatives constituted the 
dominant number of members in the executive committee 
(Yildirim, 1999). The most significant aspect of Kardemir 
process is that the employees hold a dominant position in 
the Executive Committee, meaning 4 of 7 members of the 
executive committee are employee representatives; 2 of 
the remaining 3 members represent industrialists and 
traders, and the last member represents the public and 
small-scale retailers as community. The representatives 
are elected by the shareholders in the general assembly 
of the enterprise. So far Kardemir is the only enterprise in 
Turkey which has such an organizational structure in its 
management (Gazette Cumhuriyet, 1999). And, the new 
company, Kardemir, has been operating with reasonable 
efficiency under the unions’ control since then. The em-
ployees have thus achieved the opportunity to participate 
in the management at the highest level, thereby having 
undertaken the responsibility of administering this enter-
prise. However the workers do not have the proportional 
voting rights when compared to equity.  
But it is interesting to note that a radical change has 
recently occurred in the management structure of 
Kardemir. Following the buy-out of the company’s shares 
in March 2010 by three local families active in the steel 
industry, the four workers’ representatives appointed by 
the union have lost their posts in the executive board 
(Gazette Vatan, 2010). Disillusioned by this allegedly 
collusive practice by the new owners of the company, 
Kardemir workers have begun joining the rival union, 
Turk Metal, was remarked by Kavlak Turk Metal Union 
Secretary General. Of the 2830 Kardemir employees, 
about 2000 have terminated their membership to the 
certified union, Çelik-Iş and joined Turk Metal recently 
(Gazette IL, 2010). The new Kardemir management, 
fearing that Çelik-Iş might lose its bargaining status, 
reacted by firing 29 workers and harassing many others. 
As a result, considerable unrest and even some violence 
followed while the official Capital Markets Board took the 
issue under scrutiny from a legal point of view. Turk Metal 
Secretary General has declared his union’s determination 
to take legal action against the new management on 
grounds of alleged violation of the principles of freedom 
of association, which, in view of both the Trade Unions 
Act of Turkey and the Penal Code2, is punishable by 
heavy sanctions. 
In light of these observations, the purpose of this article 
is to make an in-depth review of the Kardemir process, 
and to highlight the main questions that follow. It is 
argued that, since employee ownership is important for 
industrial democracy, the question of how an implement-
tation based on workers' participation can be improved in 
order to be more successful in practice.  The article brief-
ly reviews why the enterprise had an important mission in 
the social, cultural and economic life of the region. This is 






ownership may represent the only means by which they 
can keep their jobs in the face of a plant closure and why 
employee buyout of the weak, disorganized, and obsolete 
operations is significant. The relevant information ob-
tained through interviews with informants about Kardemir 
is summarized next. The infor-mants are namely a 
representative of metal employers’ association signatory 
to the collective agreement, an academician in a project 
team who has done research on the privatization of 
Karabuk steel mill, now called Kardemir; a union leader 
who was active during the privatization process and an 
official of the rival union. By examining the current 
situation, it is hoped that the ways by which employee 





The methodology used in this study was driven mainly by the 
objectives of describing the process of privatization of Karabuk Iron 
and Steel Mill, first, as a successful model wording off the danger of 
a definitive shutdown, and then, secondly, assessing the changes 
in the management structure of the privatized company, Kardemir, 
and, thirdly, addressing the new challenges faced by this unique 
model following the buyout of the company’s shares by three local 
families active in the community. The main goal was by making 
interviews to highlight the views of different stakeholders involved in 
the Kardemir experiment from their perspectives on a comparative 
basis.  
The theme of improved employee relations has been a critical 
element in the company’s survival under a new system where 
employees became both owners and workers thereby leading to the 
creation of an active spirit of labor- management cooperation. 
Notwithstanding this fact, the social cooperation has not prevented 
a radical change which occurred in the management of Kardemir; 
nothing could prevent the buyout of workers’ shares by private 
entrepreneurs in a free market economy. But this new state of 
affairs did not negate the value of the experiment as a result of 
which Kardemir was saved from annihilation. But at present, the 
company’s management structure and workers’ involvement are 
subject to uncertainties. 
The objectives of the study rendered the use of in-depth 
interviewing method a suitable one since privatization through 
workers’ involvement had already been achieved; the goal now was 
to capture feedback or experiences of major stakeholders’ 
representatives; but it was not possible to create as large sample of 
respondents because, as the present environment of legal action 
concerning the recent changes in ownership made it difficult to find 
more subjects willing to respond to the interview  questions. In a 
sense of five respondents who were interviewed formed a sort of 
focus group with the exception that members of the group were not 
interviewed as a group under the leadership of a moderator. But 
here as in other focus group studies members were chosen on the 
basis of their experience and expertise in the topic on which 
information is sought.  
The unstructured and spontaneous responses to open-ended 
questions are expected to reflect opinions, ideas and attitudes of 
group members about the process and problems of Kardemir 
privatization, providing fairly dependable data within a short 
timeframe. Naturally the data obtained by the interviewer (modera-
tor) of this study provides only qualitative information. Also since the 
members are not selected scientifically on a sampling method, their 
opinions  can not  be considered  to  be  truly  representative  of the 
population  at  large.  The  exploratory   information   thus   obtained  




can be used as a basis for further research.  
To reach comparable results, the same methodology was 
followed with each respondent to the extent possible, (in terms of 
question formulation, emphasis placed, etc.). For the purpose of 
this study a sample of five people was considered to be feasible. All 
being expert participants, it included policy and decision makers, 
factory staff, board member, researcher and union member, leader. 
As members from the community did not feel comfortable sharing 
their opinions, -due to the presence of the three dominant families 
from the community who were instrumental buying shares recently-, 
no community representative could be included in the sample. 
Furthermore, the fact that the case was under judicial review made 
hard to find more informants willing to talk.  
Community members were reluctant to disclose their feelings and 
attitudes, so were workers due to the fear of losing their jobs as well 
as to the uneasy situation owing to the rivalry between two con-
testing unions. Eventually the sample size turned out to be limited, 
but it included persons well-acquainted with the Kardemir process.  
The respondents were actively involved in this study as insiders. 
They were namely a representative of  metal industry employers’ 
association (MESS) which was and is signatory to the collective 
agreement in force at Kardemir; an academician in a project team 
who has done research on the privatization of Karabuk steel and 
iron works, now called Kardemir; a union leader who was active in 
the privatization process, a member of the Board of Directors of 
Kardemir and also an official of the rival union; an official of the 
current authorized (certified) union; and official of the rival union.  
In this survey where the goal was to gain detailed information on 
the processes as well as the outcomes of Kardemir privatization, 
interview appointments with the respondents were made through 
telephone contacts and interviews were conducted in their actual 
offices. Each interview took about one and a half hour. With the 
exception of same questions on matters unique to the position of 
the respondent, the same or similar questions were directed to 
group members in order to catch the whole picture from different 
perspectives or a comparative basis.  
The limited number of respondents in the group made the 
completion of the interview phase relatively easy, given the limited 
time frame planned for this phase. Some interview questions 
sought to receive concrete data while others addressed mostly 
attitudinal or perceptual insights. An in-depth literature review over 
a month helped me to prepare the open-ended questions of the 
survey form. The form used in the survey was composed of 3 parts 
and centered on basic questions. 
 On the front of the survey form is a cover letter explaining the 
study. Part I involved questions aiming to acquire the basic 
information about the privatization stages of Karabuk Iron and Steel 
Mill and initial phases of employee ownership process of Kardemir. 
Part II covered questions on information relating to current stages 
employee ownership and Part III covered questions on information 
relating to how the system can go on accurately and the possible 
course of actions for the future.  Interviews with participants took a 
month, but interpretation data and the preparation the paper also 
took over a month.  
There is no statistical data analysis of study. The data obtained 
from  the sample was reviewed and  the article indicated the 
common points arrived at  by doing a content analysis. By 
examining the situation, it is hoped that the ways by which 
employee ownership can lead to success may be determined.  
 
 
KARABUK IRON AND STEEL MILL  
 
Karabuk steel work was established in 1937 at a 
strategically selected site, far away from the iron ore 
source (Sivas Divrigi) as well as from  the  coal  centre  of 
 




the country (Zonguldak). The choice of location was 
politically motivated rather than economic. This enterprise 
has been the major factor in the development of Karabuk 
and the local area. While Karabuk was a village 
populated with less than 100 people, it has now become 
a complex industrial town with its socio-cultural facilities 
and a population of 100,000 people. The enterprise has 
been the most important source of income and employ-
ment for the town since its establishment. The economic 
life of the local area with a population of some 300,000 
people depends on the existence of the company. It is 
still the largest employer in the area with its employees 
who number around 4000. The enterprise has been the 
first and fundamental foundation upon which the econo-
mic progress of the local area was achieved, covering the 
basic municipal services ranging from education to health 
care facilities, to constructing religious, social and cultural 
buildings and leisure facilities in Karabuk. When com-
pared to the other settled areas which have a very long 
history, it became an industrial centre from a basically 
rural place and began providing income and employment 
to a sizable number of people. The company had before 
the sale become unprofitable however, having a declining 
product demand combined with obsolete equipment and 
plant layout. It also had a history of poor labor relations. 
Following the changeover the employees took a 20-30% 
wage cut and a reduction in benefits compared to those 
for similar work in other firms and accepted new work 
rules in exchange for ownership. The company was 
transferred to Kardemir Inc. by the block shares transfer 
process. The contract concluded on 30 March 1995 
assigned 35 percent of shares to the employees of the 
company, 40% to local associations of manufacturers 
and small-scale retailers associations (Karabuk 
Association of Industry and Commerce and Association 
of Safranbolu Small-scale Retailers), 25% to local 
citizens and the retired employees of the enterprise, at a 
symbolic prize of 1 TL and was opened to capital market 
operations in 1997 (Gazette Hurriyet, 1996).  As the 
company was transferred to employee ownership, an 
active spirit of cooperation was encouraged by 
emphasizing that the management and employees was 
the crew of the same ship. They had to do this to 
maintain their jobs and the company. Although Yildirim 
(1999) revealed in his study that some workers believed 
that “it would perhaps be better if the factory was closed 
down as people would be forced to look for alternative 
sources, but now everybody sees the mill as the only 
workplace.” It is very difficult to construct an effective 
buyout when the viability of the business is in doubt. 
Unfortunately, for some workers, this is their only option 
other than unemployment. 
 
 
Initial stages of employee ownership 
 





the composition of the Board of Directors was as follows: 
workers’ representatives (including some union 
representatives as well) had the dominant role at the 
initial stages where 4 board members represented the 
workers (Group A). 2 board members represented the 
chambers of commerce and industry (Group B); and one 
member represented the public (Group C, later 
abolished). The enterprise manager (CEO) was also part 
of the Board of Directors although he did not have voting 
rights in the decision-making process. All decisions 
concerning the present and future operations of the 
enterprise were taken by this 7- member Board of 
Directors. Workers’ representation in the Board was at 
the ratio of 51.8% during that time. The board and A-
Group shares in it were structured by the authorized 
union with the help of an experienced academician. This 
structure which was thus designed was consistent with 
the basic agreement of the corporation continued until the 
year 2001 (Annual Report of Kardemir, 2010). In the 
general congress of Kardemir in 2001, the union repre-
sentative was also the chairman of the shareholders’ 
congress. But, as stated by the president of the rival 
union, upon his resignation in 2001 workers lost their 
dominance in the management of the enterprise. Under 
present circumstances two local families have taken over 
the control of Kardemir’s shares. Both families represent 
B-Group shares (chambers of commerce and industry). 
In the initial stages of the process, workers’ represent-
tatives were appointed by the union, but they did not 
have voting rights. Voting rights are rarely provided to 
worker-owners, and when they are, the amount of stock 
owned by anyone employee provides little sense of 
ownership and consequently little influence. In these 
situations, employee ownership is valuable primarily as a 
corporate financing tool and not as a vehicle for union-
management cooperation  (Rosenthal et al., 1993). Union 
representatives would sit on the Board of Directors. As 
pointed out by the official of the rival union, an 
experienced person elected from amongst the Group A 
used to take part in the Board of Directors. Later, it was 
the union that appointed the union representative, as 
stated by member of the privatization project team. 
In the case of workers come to have an ownership 
stake in the firm may not wish to participate in decisions 
that were previously the domain of managers. Klein and 
Hall (1988) report that the reaction arises from concerns 
over an increased workload, a lack of skills to make a 
decision  and incompatible beliefs regarding in terms of 
the psychological contract with the employer. The direct 
interviews with the informants revealed that workers’ 
participation at initial stages was of the advisory-
consultative nature. Often in employee buyouts control is 
divorced from ownership, leaving the company 
employee-owned but not employee-controlled even 
though employees own a controlling share of the stock. In 
Kardemir, A-Group shares empowered the union through 






union administrators or representatives would at times be 
designated as board members. As stated by the rival 
union leader, Workers’ Foundation did also have a role in 
the election of 4 board members to the board 
representing A-Group shares. But the academician in the 
project team mentioned above directed criticisms against 
the Kardemir model, alleging that the union had started 
behaving like an employer. But in fact, following the 
transfer of Kardemir to workers’ ownership, management 
was represented by workers who were also the real 
decision makers; the union had an effective role in the 
decision-making process. The union provided a voice for 
workers in the employee-owned firm. Besides, it 
continued to perform functions in the traditional areas of 
collective bargaining-wages, hours and conditions of 
employment- as well as grievance procedures. 
At the initial stages of the process workers’ 
management had taken some effective measures on the 
operations of the organization according to the statement 
by the representative of metal employers’ association. 
“Employee-owners often disagreed over how to use the 
company's financial resources, on such matters as 
awarding higher wages or greater dividends in the short 
term versus reinvesting in the company to ensure its long 
term success. Among these was the dismantling or 
restructuring of certain unproductive departments.” In this 
process the management abolished the so-called 'non 
productivity premium' which was foreseen in the 
collective agreement aiming to distribute revenues also to 
workers employed in departments which had nothing to 
do with production. To do away with the existing idle and 
irrational production systems characterizing the public 
sector, the so-called 'temporary workers’ positions' were 
abolished (Milli Gazette, 25 December 1998); other 
positions were reduced to normal levels. During the initial 
years of privatization, the union emphasized its auditing 
and supervising role and did not interfere with the 
management of the enterprise; the employees were 
represented by professional managers in the Executive 
Committee. Moreover, for a few years, the leaders of the 
union were involved as members of the Kardemir 
Executive. The representative of metal employers’ 
association revealed in his speech that committee and 
performed both duties simultaneously, meaning that they 
retained their posts in the union as well, that is, repre-
senting employee interests while also administering the 
enterprise, two different functions apparently opposed to 
each other. The General Secretary of the certified union 
during the privatization and employee buyout stated that 
“there were no drawbacks in working both as a unionist 
and as a manager of the enterprise, emphasizing that 
they had even added clauses to the collective agree-
ments that envisaged union officers to be a part of the 
administration”, something that could not be realized in 
the past because of the attitudes of the employer. Thus 
Kardemir had become the first example in this endeavor.  
Although  no  change  has  occurred  in   the   types   of  




individual rights, one should note that there has been a 
proportional decrease in the amount of individual 
benefits. This decrease was due to the fact that in the 
first year after privatization there was no pay rise; the 
employees kept on working for the same amount of 
wages they were getting before privatization; and in the 
following collective bargains the pay raises achieved 
remained under the inflation rates for some years. 
Company shares turned out to be overvalued before long 
through being purchased in the capital market; when 
shares seemed to fetch reasonable prices, certain 
families began buying them out. Yildirim (1999) recalled 
that after the transition to employee ownership, the new 
management endeavored to instill a spirit of active 
cooperation into workers, emphasizing that the relations 
between management and labor should be behaving like 
they were all in the same boat. Management expects the 
workers not to oppose management and to become more 
cooperative, being attentive to the needs of the company. 
In response to the question on the subject matter of 
participation by workers’, the metal employers' asso-
ciation representative remarked: "Kardemir, affiliated with 
MESS (Metal Employer Association of Turkey) set out to 
negotiate the collective agreement in the second year 
after the privatization process; ironically the union repre-
sentative acted here on behalf of both the labor union 
and the employer simultaneously. There was a clear 
conflict of interest and roles in the process. Besides, the 
financial situation of the company was not good at that 
time. According to the statement of the union leader who 
was active during the privatization process as follows, the 
company distributed profits to workers amounting to one 
month's wages for the first and last time in 1997. Main 
motive of Kardemir was to direct revenues first to 
investment and then to employees. But the company had 
to repay debts, owing for instance four bonuses to be 
paid to workers as well as severance payments to retiring 
employees. The company wanted to grant wage 
increases to employees while at the same time it was 
faced with raw material shortages. The result was to 
finalize collective bargaining with no wage increases; 
surplus labor had to be displaced and no profit sharing 
was possible. The representative of employers’ 
association remarked that this was the general state of 
affairs at the initial stages. As these statements indicate, 
during the initial stages, the company had no profits. Any 
increase in share prices was diverted to distribution of 
profit rather than the payment of wages and salaries, as 
well as to repayment of certain indemnities and efforts 
aiming to strengthen the sports team of the company 
(Karabuk Sports Team). Kardemir had to face many 
challenges and incur losses. Additionally, the steel sector 
is quite vulnerable to crisis situations. During the 2001 
crisis production cost of steel was 311.000 TL (Turkish 
Lira) whereas the sale price was only 260.000 TL, which 
showed the plight of the company. Another factor was the 
size   of   unreasonable   amounts    devoted    to    social  
 




expenditures. Therefore workers were worried about the 
future of the enterprise. Thus, they were given almost no 
wage increases. They possessed company shares 
whose future values were unknown. And they began 
selling these shares to anyone who was happy to buy 
them at low prices. “This process brought the company to 
its present ailing state”, said the as well as representative 
of the employers’ association and the academician. The 
management could not take necessary measures to 
become efficient while also representing the union and it 
was reluctant to dismiss employers. 
 
 
Current state of employee ownership 
 
Employees' share in the company was 51.8 per cent by 
the end of 1994 (Ersoz et al., 2002; Annual Report of 
Kardemir Inc., 1997). This meant workers had the control 
of the enterprise which also included other local groups. 
Presently workers' share has declined; the 7-member 
board is now controlled by three families although there 
still is one union representative (the representative of the 
metal employers’ association, MESS, personal communi-
cation, 18 May 2010 and the academician, personal 
communication, 28 May 2010). Workers' ownership is 
only at a marginal level at present, as reported by the 
president of the rival union and an ex-union leader who 
was active during the privatization process. Statements 
by the president of the rival union, Turk Metal, personal 
communication, (02 May 2010) and ex-certified union 
leader personal communication, (05 June 2010) 
remarked "ironically three families who own 10.96% of 
the shares according to the company’s financial report 
have taken complete control of management”. They have 
participated in the general congress of the corporation 
with 27.4% of the shares. Karçel and Kardokmaksan 
Companies’ families have used 79 million TL worth of 
shares in their election through the general congress, 
resulting in a loss for the company worth 23 million TL. 
The share of these two families is only 20% while in the 
present management they represent 40%. According to 
the view of the member of the research team during the 
privatization period, about the composition of the present 
Board of Directors, there are two persons representing 
workers or the union. Workers seem to have voting rights 
at the proportion of their representation but only through 
their representatives, meaning they cannot exercise 
voting rights in proportion to their shares.  
The ex-union leader remarks that the chairman of the 
Board of Directors is appointed in essence by election, 
but one should note that in practice the person nominated 
by the strongest of the three families becomes the 
chairman. In view of the Security Exchange Commission 
legislation the chairman of the board must be a neutral 
(independent) person co-opted by the parties involved. 
But in this process dominated by the so-called families 





who does not meet the criterion of neutrality is appointed 
as the chairman, usually outside the knowledge of the 
union. The widely shared view also favors the election of 
an outsider neutral in compliance with the basic agree-
ment of the company. “Managers should be professional 
experts, as was the case from the very beginning.” As 
stated by the president of the rival union, “the pro-
fessional manager must also be a person well grounded 
in capital markets.” A different view favors the election of 
directors who represent capital, that those who own the 
capital shares must form the Board of Directors (the 
representative of the metal employers’ association, 
MESS, personal communication, 18 May 2010 and the 
academician, personal communication, 28 May 2010). In 
the opinion of the employers’ association representative, 
the present structure reflects this view, meaning the 
company has begun operating like a real, profit oriented 
economic entity. The same informant also believes that, 
though the union has made positive contributions initially, 
it is now the present management structure which is 
better able to manage the production processes. "The 
role of the union in the decision making process has now 
diminished and the enterprise has become profitable. 
Implementations by management must be through 
professional people. It is also useful to include one or two 
members from the outside to provide transparency.” 
Presently there is no effective participation of workers in 
management. The union takes participation for granted 
as it is still active. The certified union Çelik-Iş represen-
tative has been careful not to identify himself too closely 
with management for fear of being held responsible for 
incorrect decisions. He also reported that management 
required professional expertise; "it is none of our 
business to direct a company, as a labor union we are 
representing workers and their rights, not the manage-
ment. Our place is to negotiate at the bargaining table."  
Workers suffered losses following the year 2002 upon 
the transfer of shares. They lost some of their rights. 
Wage increases based on the collective agreement were 
not granted, as 42% of entitlements were frozen or 
withdrawn or suspended. With the joint action of Çelik-Iş 
Union and company management, the company general 
manager was granted high rates of salary increase while 
workers' wages were cut by 42%. Workers were also 
denied any wage rise despite a declared profit of 256 
million TL. In those lean years this was probably the 
correct decision, given the fact that employment levels 
would be maintained. In this process one thousand 
workers became entitled to retirement. Statement by the 
ex-union leader of currently certified union and the official 
of the rival union revealed that what the worker suffered 
most was his/her diminished purchasing power which in 
turn compelled him to sell his/her shares at the capital 
markets. The certified union as well as the interested 
parties were knew the changeover, but the union did not 
take any action to thwart the process. The process was 






engaging in transactions to buy and sell them. Informant 
and namely the academician who has done research on 
the Kardemir privatization stated that the union remained 
neutral to the process, and "workers who found them-
selves poorer showed only mild reactions, as they were 
the sellers in the last analysis.” In fact workers were not 
enthusiastic or interested in taking part in management 
as they were displeased with the union's taking on the 
role of an employer. Economic crises were another factor 
obstructing the union from taking any efficient action to 
prevent the changeover (the representative of the metal 
employers’ association, MESS, personal communication, 
18 May 2010). But the attitudes of the rival union, Turk-
Metal, towards this process were noteworthy. The rival 
union was instrumental in instigating a workers' campaign 
against the changeover. However, the company 
management supported Çelik-Iş as the authorized union. 
During the inter-union rivalry the employer dismissed six 
workers on grounds of economic crisis. Allured by the 
disgruntled workers, Turk- Metal started an organizing 
campaign in the year 2010 (the president of the rival 
union, Turk Metal, personal communication, 02 May 
2010). 
In response to the question on the reaction of the new 
management to the inter-union rivalry at the enterprise 
after the changeover, the president of the rival union and 
the ex-union leader pointed out: “the employer still 
supports and favors Çelik-Iş, the certified union which 
was active during the process. In addition to the dismissal 
of 29 workers, the new management put some 
employees on paid leave and showed its determination to 
keep the certified union at Kardemir as the competent 
labor organization by taking measures such as hiring new 
workers and organizing them as Çelik-Iş members.” 
Freedom of association means that workers should be 
free in their choice of a union, so employer's practice 
clearly violates the law. The employer began hiring new 
workers as 2010 of the 2680 unionizable workers joined 
the rival union, Turk Metal, by June 2010 (Call Gazette, 
2010). But the employment of new workers by the 
management was somewhat a belated action, so it is not 
likely to affect the certification process which will confirm 
the bargaining rights of Turk Metal. In future actions, Turk 
Metal seems willing to strive to compensate for the lost 
rights of workers, aiming to prevent the misuses and 
injustices of the past and correct them in line with the 
requirements of the basic company agreement. 
Concerning the question on possible measures that 
can be taken to keep the company under workers' con-
trol; the academician remarks that "this could be possible 
if certain conditions were set out at initial stages, like 
distributing share coupons upon retirement. But 
unfortunately shares were being traded off from the very 
beginning". The basic company agreement is like the 
constitution of the organization, but apparently the 
presence of such a basic text is not sufficient. There must 
be basic provisions like “golden shares” which  cannot be  




transferred in any case. And above all, the principle of 
honesty and fair dealing must be respected fully, as 
stated by the ex- union leader. Normally, the Board is 
established as a trust which is separate from the 
company that undertakes on behalf of the staff the 
management of shares allocated to employees (Salkinc 
et al., 2007).  Each year part of the stock ownership fund 
is transferred to workers' accounts by the company 
according to shares or cash assistance based on working 
hours of workers, their wage levels and some other 
criteria, but the fund must pay attention to equal 
distribution of annual shares to workers who have the 
same seniority and engaged in similar work. Normally 
members of the account will hold these accumulated 
contributions in their accounts after retirement or after 
leaving work. Those assets are not within the scope of 
taxation (Bogetic, 1993). 
The ex-union leader remarked on the question of the 
general evaluation of the Kardemir privatization and on 
how an implementation based on workers' participation 
can be successful: "Kardemir was introduced as a 
successful model to the world under the initiative of 
European Trade Union Confederation. This view was 
realistic until the year 2001. Workers had a sense of 
ownership over the Kardemir steel works. But the present 
state of affairs seems to run counter to the general logic 
of labor unionism. The recent change of ownership has 
materialized unfortunately with the cooperation of the 
union, Çelik-Iş. The alleged violations of the company's 
basic agreement are likely to result in certain legal 
sanctions”. “The parties involved in this process did not 
see the experiment as a long-run attempt of accumulating 
savings in the hands of workers. Ownership of capital 
underwent changes before it could spread to rank and 
file. There is not much chance for the success of this 
model in Turkey, as a few other examples have shown in 
the past. Fragmentation of unity in decision making is 
likely to lead to failures in business.” pointed out the 
academician and the representative of the metal 
employers’ association also.  
On the question, "Could the system prove to be more 
successful if the shares were treated as retirement 
premiums or a severance pay fund?" answered the 
representative of metal employers' association: “such 
plans are future oriented; their benefits are protracted to 
an unknown future, whereas the worker perceives pre-
sent values as more important than future uncertainties.” 
But in any case Kardemir was a successful model by 
which the Karabuk steel works was saved from 
annihilation. The above-stated recent problems do not 
negate the validity of this experiment, pointed out the ex-
union leader also. It can be used in future privatizations, 
provided that adequate measures are taken by consi-
dering the lessons learned from the Kardemir experiment. 
Employee ownership can be readily implemented in 
corporations whose capital is not opened to public (the 
academician, personal  communication,  28  May  2010).  
 




Workers' ownership was not new in Turkey since workers' 
investment plans were launched in the previous decades 
by Turkish guest workers employed in European 
countries, but they too had failed for similar reasons (the 
representative of the metal employers’ association, 
MESS, personal communication, 18 May 2010). The 
amelioration of the present state of affairs is not very 
likely since it is not possible to redeem the shares. The 
technology of the enterprise is somewhat outdated. 
Informant and namely the academician who has done 
research on the Kardemir privatization remarked that at 
present representation of the union in the Board of 
Directors can be viewed as a success. If correct and 
rational decisions based on lessons learned from the 
recent past can be taken, the present, structure of 
Kardemir can survive into future with a reasonable 
degree of success, stated by the president of the rival 
union. “Under the present family-owned management 
which runs the company profitably according to business 
principles, all stakeholders must feel contented”, was 






This article has reviewed the employee ownership pro-
cess which was put into practice in Kardemir. Survey of 
the major studies in the field of employees’ participation 
as shareholders in Kardemir was examined. First, 
Yidirim’s (1999) study had been referring to the initial 
years of privatization of the enterprise. The union had an 
active role in the managerial organization of Kardemir. 
Ersoz at al. (2002) stated in their study that as the com-
pany was transferred to privatization through employee 
ownership that had contributed to the protection of jobs 
and fundamental human and employment rights in 
Kardemir, strengthening the role of the union in the 
enterprise and changing the conflictual industrial relations 
environment to one based on cooperation. Naturally, the 
data obtained at the current study was not altering the 
general theme of the above studies but tried to examine 
the radical change that has occurred in the current 
structure of Kardemir. Then argued for an agenda to re-
examine and revised the ways that can make the 
employee participation process successful.  
The strength of the study was that it could give 
incredibly detailed review opinions, ideas and attitudes of 
group members who were all expert participants and 
were well-acquainted with Kardemir process. 
Respondents were also more relaxed in which to 
collect information; they felt comfortable having a 
conversation about open ended questions. However 
there were a few limitations, thus generalizations about 
the results were not able to be made because of small 
samples were chosen and random sampling methods 





reluctant to disclose their feelings and also some 
community members refused to talk about the case. The 
unstructured and spontaneous responses to open-ended 
questions are expected to reflect opinions, ideas and 
attitudes of group members.  
The prevalent feeling was that stakeholders were 
declared as common point about the Kardemir case, was 
the dominance freedom of entrepreneurship in the 
creation of a new employee-owned and managed 
company. As a result of the combat, the trade union led 
buy-out of the Kardemir steel mill provides a positive 
example of how trade union intervention can help to 
address the adverse effects of privatization or the closure 
of publicly owned enterprises. Notwithstanding this fact, 
the social cooperation has not prevented a radical 
change which occurred in the management of Kardemir; 
nothing could prevent the buyout of workers’ shares by 
private entrepreneurs in a free market economy, means 
that shape of partnership and portion of shares change 
hands time to time in accordance with nature of the 
process. But this new state of affairs did not negate the 
value of the experiment as a result of which Kardemir 
was saved from annihilation. In light of these develop-
ments, employee ownership is important for industrial 
democracy, the question of how an implementation 
based on employee participation can be improved in 
order to be more successful in practice for the others. 
Several participants strongly felt that “though the union 
has made positive contributions initially, it is now the 
present management structure which is able to manage 
the production process”. The prevalent feeling one of the 
respondent was that “workers’ ownership plans were 
launched in the previous decades had also failed for 
similar reasons; the employee ownership structure of 
Kardemir could not be survived with a success”. But even 
if this happens, the initial Kardemir model of employee 
ownership will still qualify as a beneficial form of 
privatization which has eventually saved the company 
and the workers’ jobs. Most participants agreed that the 
present structure of Kardemir can survive into future with 
a reasonable degree of success, if rational decisions 
based on lessons learned from the past can be taken. 
With these observations in mind, I would suggest that 
broader research is required to properly consider the 
various ways in which employee ownership can be 
successful, such as voting rights that are separate from 
equity accumulation, and an effective education and 
training process. Voting rights are the means by which 
employees exercise control over their equity. Companies 
should be strongly committed to employee ownership, 
treat employees as owners, and bring employees into 
company decision-making. Education and training should 
help employees at all levels to obtain the expertise 
necessary to function actively as employee-owners. The 
training should build job skills and participative skills while 
also expanding on the understanding of the business. 






equity accumulation and with continuous education and 
training, employees and the entity may optimize their 
chances for success. A positive union-management 
relationship has to be developed over time by working 
successfully together on cooperative activities. Employee 
ownership can provide opportunities and an incentive for 
the union and management to work together, but for this 
a structured process must be established. Finally, one 
should note that those running the company may not 
have the entrepreneurial capacity and managerial 
expertise they need. Employee ownership may enhance 
organizational effectiveness, but it is not a guarantee that 
a company will be a success in the marketplace. Often 
outside professionals must be hired to help in critical 






Employees' participation as shareholders has created 
diverse results in terms of employees and industrial 
relations in comparison to other types of privatization. 
The employees who become shareholders of the 
enterprise via privatization tend to become more effective 
in management through their organizations. In light of 
these developments, it must be recalled that both the 
organizational structure of management as well as the 
pioneering role of the union in the privatization process 
were effective means through which the union became 
influential on management. The prevalent feeling was 
that the most important factor in the process of creating 
Kardemir was the union. Notwithstanding the benefits 
that workers have gained from the privatisation of the 
steel works, there are ongoing challenges associated 
with the management of the steelworks. It was argued, 
the union was thought to be responsible both for the 
success and the failure of the enterprise. In particular, the 
lines between trade union representatives and 
management are not as clearly drawn as they were 
previously, as trade union officials may be required to 
fulfil functions related to both employee representation 
and management. However, the union continues to 
negotiate with management in relation to wages, hours 
and conditions of employment- as well as grievance 
procedures. If managed correctly, its dual function can 
provide workers on the shop floor with a stronger voice in 
relation to business and management issues. 
It has been suggested that improved employee 
relations have been a critical element in the company’s 
survival, helping to increase productivity and profits. 
Under the initial system after privatization, where 
employees are both owners and workers, an active spirit 
of labor-management cooperation has been encouraged, 
an attitude which positively influences day to day 
management and collective negotiations.  
Kardemir has had some financial problems during 2001 




and 2008 crises, but so far the company has proven 
robust enough to endure these situations. Another 
challenge is that, as the performance of Kardemir has 
progressed, there is the likelihood of employee shares to 
be purchased by outsiders in which case employee 
representatives may lose the control of company 
management. Following the buy-out of the company’s 
shares in March 2010 by three community families active 
in the steel industry, the four workers’ representatives 
appointed by the union have lost their posts in the 
executive board. According to this allegedly collusive 
practice of the new owners of the company and the 
certified union, Kardemir workers have begun joining the 
rival union, Türk Metal. Today, the whole process shows 
that it is not just a simple authorization race between rival 
unions at Kardemir. In the last six months prior to the 
authorization4, 300 workers who are working for a long 
time in Kardemir were fired. On the other hand, certified 
union was hired 1,200 new workers. According to press 
news, the number of workers to be dismissed is likely to 
equal the number of new recruits. Since those who are 
extracted from work are chosen from amongst the 
workers who are members of rival union Turk-Metal and 
the ones recently recruited are forced to join Çelik-Iş 
even before they are hired, Çelik-Iş with a membership of 
2568 workers turned out to be the certified union, as 
opposed to Turk-Metal whose membership dropped to 
1394 workers. Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMB) is 
the regulatory and supervisory authority in charge of the 
securities markets in Turkey, took the issue under 
scrutiny from a legal point of view. 
Employee ownership is one approach that union and 
management partners can take to improve organizational 
effectiveness, save jobs, and enhance the quality of work 
life. Financial success flows from organizational success. 
But organizational success means that stock ownership 
must also include a sense of job ownership. There is a lot 
of rhetoric concerning employee ownership; when it is 
tied to majority control of the stocks, it carries with it great 
opportunity and great risk. The key, as with other 
approaches is to pursue employee ownership jointly in a 
careful and organized fashion. By building on high-quality 
union-management cooperation at the equity, 
governance, managerial, and operational levels, 
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1The union, Çelik-Iş, amalgamated with another steel union in 1991 to 
form a new union with 90.000 members called Özçelik-Iş. 
2The Penal Code of Turkey No 5237 of 26 September 2004 brings 
penal sanctions which shall apply to those who, by using force or 
threats, obstruct the exercise of one’s trade union rights, with the 
objective of compelling him to join or not to join a union, to participate or 
not to participate in union activities or forcing one to leave a post in 
union administration, ranging from a prison term of six months up to two 
years. The sanction to apply in the case of obstructing a union’s 
activities shall be a prison term of one year up to three years (Article 
118). 
4Dual criteria for a union’s authorization for collective bargaining in 
Turkey; the requirement that in order for a labor union to obtain 
authorization for collective bargaining at an establishment or enterprise, 
it must first represent at least 10 per cent of workers in the industry 
branch in which it has been established, and second, it must represent 
more than half of the workers at the establishment or enterprise 
concerned. The underlying motive was the creation of a neater union 
structure with fewer unions, so the authorization complications caused 
by the so-called “union inflation” could be eradicated. 
 
 
 
 
